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IAC-D-55/3
27 January 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

1. Attached for concurrence of the IAC is a current report on NSC 135 in respect of intelligence as of 31 December 1952. This paper has been prepared in cooperation with the IAC agencies' representatives and so far as is known takes into account their suggestions.

2. The NSC requires that this paper be submitted 1 February 1953. It would, therefore, be appreciated if each agency would telephone its concurrence or proposed changes to the Secretary of the IAC by noon Friday, 30 January 1953.

[Redacted]
Acting Secretary

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I. National Estimates

1. The organization and procedures established since October 1950 for the production of national intelligence estimates have now been proved in practice. These estimates draw upon the totality of resources of the entire intelligence community and can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These estimates derive authority from the manner of their preparation and from the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.

2. The production program for national intelligence estimates provides for a re-examination of existing estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the production of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important topics. Special effort is being made to schedule the completion of basic estimates on the USSR in advance of the review of budget estimates and NATO plans.

3. Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the one hand, and the intelligence community on the other, is continually being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced both useful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time when the policy is fixed.

4. "Post-mortems," designed to reveal deficiencies in the preparation of selected estimates and to stimulate corrective action, will continue to be held. The experience of past months in this procedure, particularly as applied in the case of estimates on the Far East, indicates that the results are beneficial.

II. Political, Social, and Cultural

1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence is very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for the production of such intelligence, however, are adequate only for the most urgent needs of the IAC agencies. Less pressing demands can be met only partially and inadequately.

2. The principal deficiency in this field is in the effort devoted to the exhaustive research on which sound estimates and analysis on current development depend.

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